Saturday, June 27, 2009
I Can See Hawaii From Pyongyang
Thursday, June 25, 2009
Axis of Weasel
Press Conference by the Deputy Press Secretary Yasuhisa Kawamura (pictured)
25 June, 2009
IV. Questions concerning the POW issue
Q: If other people have any questions directly related to today's issue, I have some completely different questions.
Mr. Kawamura: Any questions, please.
Q: I would like to ask about the POW issues. One, about the official apology, so-called, by Ambassador Fujisaki in the US in the end of May; The apology was a so-called official apology from the Japanese Government, but is it projected only for Bataan and Corregidor? Because he came over to the convention and made the apology. Also, how serious is the Japanese government's thinking about their demand which is educating Japanese young people to know what happened about POWs and also the program exchange inviting them, because Americans were excluded. The program covering Dutch, Australian, British POWs, inviting them to Japan and let them visit camps they used to be in. Those are two questions about the Fujisaki apology.
The second question is about very recently a POW from Australia and the son of a POW from Scotland who were made use of in the Aso mines visited. Prime Minister Aso did not meet them, he refused to meet them. What is the real reason he did not meet them?
Mr. Kawamura: Before I forget, let me start with the last question.
Q: OK.
Mr. Kawamura: Those people visited Tokyo and requested a meeting with Prime Minister Aso. The meeting did not take place. You are asking me about the reasons, but I am not the right person to respond directly to that question, why the meeting did not take place.
Q: But the Ministry of Foreign Affairs offered to meet instead.
Mr. Kawamura: Right, exactly, but unfortunately, this proposed meeting did not take place.
I am going to touch upon the basic stance of the Japanese Government regarding the POWs. All the actions and the Japanese treatment of the POWs should be understood in the context of Japan's post-war announcements which clarify its official stance. As you recall, former Prime Minister Murayama expressed very clearly that we had a sense of remorse and apology for the conducts of what Japan did during World War II.
Regarding the government to government relations, we think that the issues related to World War II have been legally settled.
This stance together with the feeling of the Government and the people of Japan has been expressed by our leaders in the past.
The first question about Ambassador Fujisaki's statement should also be seen from the Japanese Government's fundamental stance concerning the World War II and the apology and feeling of remorse that should be applied to the case of Japan-Philippines relations during World War II. I understand Ambassador Fujisaki expressed his feeling in line with the above mentioned official Japan-Philippines relations.
There are two more questions about Ambassador Fujisaki's case, education and Dutch and other countries' invitation programs, I will come back to you. I need to do some research on this.
Q: About the second question, if the Foreign Minister tried to meet them instead of the Prime Minister...
Mr. Kawamura: The Foreign Ministry, not the Foreign Minister, I think.
Q: The Foreign Ministry, yes. How were you planning to explain to them the reason that you did not prepare any explanation why the Prime Minister could not see them or did not want to see them or whatever? Or did you try to repeat what you have just explained?
Mr. Kawamura: Well, it is really hard for me to predict what exactly happened in the conversation particularly with visitors and our officials. But I want to stress that we like to see those people with sincere minds and that we would be prepared to listen carefully to what they would comment on. I think a sincere dialogue should help retain trust.
Q: May I ask which section is planning to meet them? Who is going to meet them?
Mr. Kawamura: I will come back to you because this issue is related to not one but more than two divisions or bureaus.
Q: It would be very nice if I could know who is going to see them.
Mr. Kawamura: Yes, I will come back to you.
Any other questions? Thank you very much.
Wednesday, June 24, 2009
Washington Work
David Letterman: Mark Sanford was "in Argentina with another woman. And here's what I want to know: Why can't he be like our former governor and use a local escort service?"
Craig Ferguson: Mark Sanford "admitted to having an affair in Argentina. Great, now we're outsourcing mistresses."
Craig Ferguson: "The past couple of years there have been a whole bunch of scandals involving governors. ... You know things are bad when the most normal governor of the last decade was Jesse 'The Body' Ventura."
Still later:
Conan O'Brien: "At a press conference yesterday, in case you don't know, South Carolina Gov. Mark Sanford admitted to having a mistress from Argentina. ... Then there was an awkward moment as he waited for someone to give him a high five."
David Letterman: Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, "during all those protests, is keeping a very low profile in Iran. His staff said he was hiking."
Jimmy Fallon: "There's another new development in that Mark Sanford story. His wife, Jenny, kicked him out of their home when she heard about the affair. In response, Hillary Clinton said, 'Wait, you can do that?'"
Monday, June 22, 2009
Holbrooke Watch I
Holbrooke has campaigned long and hard to be Secretary of State. And it appears that he is getting close to his goal. So that you can get a sense as to when this will happen, I will try to provide you with an occasional update of this relentless quest with "Holbrooke Watch."
From the moment he was appointed in January 2009 as State's Special Representative on Afghanistan and Pakistan he has managed to dominate the foreign policy news. He knows how to make news and to present nothing as news. He is also very charming and friendly with female journalists.
Thus, it should have come as no surprise that when Secretary Clinton broke her elbow last week, that he was the first to insist that he go to this week's G-8 meeting of foreign ministers in Trieste.
My guess from the exchange below is that Clinton sent Special Envoy George Mitchell to Trieste simply to keep an eye on Holbrooke. Mitchell does not intimidate as easily as career officials like Under Secretary William J. Burns, who is attending the G-8 for the Secretary and who can easily have their career ruined by the likes of Holbrooke.
MR. KELLY: -- a big cast and a sling. And she’s a right-hander, so it’s – she’s got some dexterity and mobility issues. But she was on top of her game this morning.
QUESTION: Can you explain to us, Ian, why – Deputy Secretary Steinberg said that Special Representative Holbrooke and Special Envoy Mitchell would also be in Trieste. I think it’s well known, the Afghanistan-Pakistan related meetings.
MR. KELLY: Right.
QUESTION: But what is going to be Ambassador Mitchell’s – Senator Mitchell’s role in Trieste?
MR. KELLY: I believe there’s also a Quartet meeting. I hope I’m not out of ahead of myself by saying that, but I believe there’s also – yeah, they will be talking about Middle East issues as well.
QUESTION: So he would represent the United States at the Quartet meeting?
MR. KELLY: I’m not sure – I’m not sure what – I mean, he would participate.
QUESTION: Okay.
Sunday, June 21, 2009
Forbes Misses the Big Story
I was going to discuss North Korea or the new Japanese politics of apology, but then I made the mistake of reading Tim Kelly's new dispatch from Tokyo. It is rare that I do read his pieces, and I now remember why. They make no sense.
Former allied prisoner of war Joe Coombs came to Tokyo seeking an apology for the time he spent shoveling coal as a slave laborer in an Aso-family coal mine. Coombs' is one foreigner’s opinion Aso might choose to ignore.
Thursday, June 18, 2009
Japan's Changing Role?
Titled, Japan's Changing Role, the hearing will feature Professor Joseph Nye from Harvard, Dr. Adam Posen from the Peterson Institute for International Economics, and Dr. Mike Green from CSIS (he had to rearrange his schedule). Professor Kent Calder from Johns Hopkins SAIS is likely to be added.
Wednesday, June 17, 2009
It's Not Just Me
He was appalled by the lack of preparation of the Congressmen holding the hearing, North Korea's Nuclear and Missile Tests and the Six-Party Talks: Where Do We Go From Here. It was jointly held by two subcommittees of the House Foreign Affairs Committee: Asia and Terrorism.
Today's joint House HFAC subcommittee hearing on N. Korea policy (by Asia & Pacific, and Terrorism) could have made a real public service today, had it been interested in serious discussion with highly experienced, very diverse policy advocates including Sig Harrison, Richard Bush, Scott Snyder, and Tom Hubbard.Neither Hubbard nor Harrison appeared to have written statements ready for distribution at the time of the hearing (you can find them all now online along with a video and transcript here). Guess the interns were slow in writing it. Amb. Hubbard was also so practiced at repeating his thoughts on Korea, that he merely spoke off the cuff. Harrison, a former Washington Post journalist who discovered North Korea, tends to sensationalize and focus on a "story lead."
It wasn't, so the opportunity was lost.
Bush, Snyder and Hubbard patiently outlined the critical issue of China's evolving views...and angst...over NK actions this year; the rising pressure on Japan and S. Korea was cogently analyzed; each explained why they now have, reluctantly, concluded that the game has changed and the DPRK is no longer interested in negotiating its nuclear program.
Harrison paradoxically agreed, but said that's entirely the US fault because the US won't renounce the possible use of force, including nukes, against the DPRK. A tautological argument, to be sure, but a very important point meriting serious debate.
Not from this group of Members. Rather, the only real passion came with demands to immediately effect the rescue of the two women, the absolute nadir of which was Chairman Faleomavega's final remark after a long, 2.5 hour exercise:
"We need to wonder whether the 6 Party nuclear talks are more important than these two women..."
Having thus trivialized the nuclear issue beyond any rational point of recognition, Faleomavega earlier, correctly noted that N. Korea and Iran seem to be held to a different standard than India and Pakistan.
But he went on to suggest a practical and moral equivalency between the US and NK nuclear arsenals.
This is taking objectivity to new heights, one might suppose, but as serious discussion of reality, including US treaty commitments based on reality, it begs a few questions...none of which were articulated by Members.
Sunday, June 14, 2009
The Nominee
**This is a very popular noun in Washington's foreign policy community, although its use is not quite correct. It is a bit like saying you have go to the lavatory...
Betrayed by Wisemen
Skip the Carnegie summary of the event. It misses General Scowcroft's message. Instead, go either to the transcript or the video. There he describes President George H W Bush's adamant desire to maintain the US-China relationship, at all costs.
LT. GEN. SCOWCROFT:….I think one of the ways we need to think of the Tiananmen episode is one that is not talked about very much. And that is, it was a pretty fundamental watershed in not only the relationship, but in the evolution of China – because in the days before Tiananmen, Nixon had established a relationship, and it was a good relationship and very profitable for both sides. But it was very narrow. It dealt with Soviet hegemony – things like that – nothing else. We had no trade. We didn’t have any of the other things that go in international relations. Suddenly, that was broken.
The end of the Cold War meant that we had nothing to talk about, basically. And, at the same time, sort of, our ability to talk was destroyed at Tiananmen Square – or that was the danger. So when it happened, there were two things. First of all, we had to respond. We couldn’t just ignore what had happened there, so we had to take action. We took the action basically against the Chinese army – against the relationship we had with the Chinese army – which was pretty good at that time.
….But the president was adamant: This relationship is too important to sacrifice. So we tried to reach out, and I won’t go through all of that. Anyway, at the end we met, and we managed to rescue the dialogue part of the relationship.
….Well, we started out with a whole list of possible sanctions – from the State Department, Defense Department, so on – a whole big list of what we could do. The President was clearly ill at ease with it. He knew we had to do something – but foremost in his mind was the importance of this relationship.
….And he picked the sanctions that he thought would do the least harm to the psychological relationship. And then he immediately said: Now, what can we do to offset this?
[Scowcroft was then sent on a secret mission to see Deng Xiaoping less than two weeks after the massacre.]
MR. KOPPEL: And you guys are already trying to smooth things over.
LT. GEN. SCOWCROFT: And we’re already trying to smooth things over, and that was a big issue: Well, now, you know, we want to smooth things over, but Congress was in an uproar.
Everybody was in an uproar.
MR. KOPPEL: Right.
LT. GEN. SCOWCROFT: How does it look to send an emissary, as if you’re, you know, kowtowing [vague in the transcript but the word I heard]. So we said: Well, let’s do it in secret. So I got on a transport airplane – a military aircraft. Had aerial refueling over there. They parked the aircraft behind the terminal building in Beijing, so nobody saw it, and we went over and back completely clandestinely.
MR. KOPPEL: And you met with Deng?
LT. GEN. SCOWCROFT: Oh, yes.
MR. KOPPEL: Can you tell us a little about that conversation?
LT. GEN. SCOWCROFT: Yes. He met me warmly and said: You know, I have really relinquished my official position. I’m meeting with you as an old friend. And so we went in and we sat down. And after the pleasantries he said: Well, it’s wonderful to see you, but I don’t know why you’re here. He said: What we’ve done is our own business. It has nothing to do with you or anybody else. And why are you here interfering in our business? And so I said: Well, you’re absolutely right. What you did is completely your own business. But the consequences of what you did have great effect on the United States and U.S. policy, and that’s why I’m here. So we went through this. And, in the end, it became clear to both sides – we didn’t do a lot of business then. Both sides know: We want to retain that ability to communicate.
MR. KOPPEL: So the main thrust of this meeting – and this is – have you written about this? Forgive me, I should have –
LT. GEN. SCOWCROFT: Part of that is in the book President Bush and I wrote.
MR. KOPPEL: Essentially, your concern, quite literally, less than two weeks after the events of Tiananmen, and the concern of the Chinese government, is: We can’t let this relationship suffer.
LT. GEN. SCOWCROFT: Absolutely – yes.
For the transcripts and video: HERE.
Saturday, June 13, 2009
Happy Bloggers
...media reports were based on the impression of "Japan experts" like Armitage and former National Security Council director for Asia Michael Green [now CSIS]. These Japan experts monopolize contacts with Japanese companies and politicians and form a small circle of close acquaintances in a kind of "mutual admiration society." Even after the turnover from a Republican to a Democratic government, theirs is a mechanism to protect mutual interest by dispatching officials on Japanese affairs from their exclusive circle. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia Kurt Campbell is also a member of this inner circle.Since they do not have any connections with Roos, both the so-called "experts on the U.S." and the "experts on Japan" are dissatisfied, calling his appointment a "downgrade." Yet, these very people are the culprits for the lack of stability in the Japan-U.S. relationship. Perhaps it is time to say goodbye to this inner circle. [emphasis added]
Monday, June 8, 2009
Unique Japan
Why after 30 years of research was the survival rate the same? Why was so little research funding going toward breast cancer? Why did every doctor she talked to have a different answer?
And what is this “nonsense,” she exclaimed that Japan has a low incidence of breast cancer. Too many of her Japanese girlfriends have had breast cancer. The water, air, and food here is not that different in the U.S. “The truth,” she railed “is that doctors in Japan do not require women to get mammograms.” She ticked off all her friends and family who had never gotten an exam. By the time cancer is diagnosed it has spread to other organs and thus not recorded as a death by breast cancer.
“There is nothing special or unique about Japan” she concluded, “just that women matter less.”
I was the maid of honor at her wedding years ago. We both had gone to Smith, a woman’s college, where we learned to speak up. She came to the U.S. after failing to become a JAL stewardess. She was told she was too tall, 5’9”, and that it would be impolite for her to look down on most of the airline’s clients.
I listened and hoped that the dinner and empathy I brought helped a little to one of my oldest friends. There was not much more I could do as my friend at Japan Without the Sugar tells me Japan is unique, it is after all the only country blessed with four seasons.
My mammogram has been scheduled.
Get Involved: Susan G. Komen for the Cure, is the world’s largest source of nonprofit funds for breast cancer research and community outreach programs with $1 billion invested to date. Although Komen has international affiliates, there are none in Asia,
Sunday, June 7, 2009
A Lesson for All
Friday, June 5, 2009
After The Death Marches
Later: Here is the CNN Report on this past weekend's Berga reunion attended by Maj. Gen. Vincent Boles, an emissary from the Army. He told the group that "These men were abused and put under some of the most horrific conditions, It wasn't a prison camp. It was a slave labor camp." As one Berga survivor responded, "It means a great deal -- that it's being recognized and understood."
Tuesday, June 2, 2009
Hidden Behind the Apology
Outside my bedroom window, the catalpa tree has finally bloomed. Its broad leaves and large white flowers block my view of the crabapple tree under which my kitty is buried. The southern catalpa is a late bloomer.
When Dr. Tenney was first invited to meet with the Ambassador in November 2008, seasoned negotiators all warned that the meeting would be frustrating and designed to defuse but not solve the problem. He was advised "not to smile until he got into the taxi to return." To his credit, Dr. Tenney, a survivor of the Bataan Death March, a Hell Ship, and a Mitsui coal mine, ignored all the advice he was given. As Ms. Tokudome admonished the scholars and diplomats advising them: "Let Lester be Lester."
Aside from a wire report online at TBS and Kyodo, there has been no acknowledgement of the apology. There has also been no annoucement on the Japanese Foreign Ministry or Embassy of Japan in the US websites. Reportedly, the Japanese Washington press corps was briefed on 5:30pm Friday, May 29th, the night before the Ambassador flew down to Texas. The Mainichi Shimbun, which had a reporter at the ADBC Convention, is yet to publish an article.
When I asked a Japanese friend from a prominent family who lived through the war about this, he replied: "If Amb. Fujisaki's initiative ever meant something, it was devalued by the neglect by the media, letting the entire Japanese population miss a good chance to stop and think"
He is right. The real point was not so much the apology, but the opportunity for the Japanese people to begin the discussion about the Pacific War and how it has shaped the US-Japan Alliance. The two country's often dramatically different views on the causes and conduct of the War have unrecognized affects on the security dialogue. It is not enough to supposedly share values. The dissimilar lessons learned from the War highlight that Japan and the US have entirely different analytical frameworks from which to consider national security.